THIS POST IS BY MANDOS, NOT IAN
The fundamental unit of representative democracy in the vertically-stacked, hierarchical systems of governance of most modern states that claim to be democratic is the political career of the individual representative, not, as it might seem on the surface to some, the vote. This is necessarily the case, because during the term of representation, the representative is only bound at best indirectly to the will of the voters, and in formal terms, principally through the risk of being rewarded or punished at the next election through the ballot box. The reward of cushy post-office positions and honours, effectively post hoc bribery, is not “formally” a part of the system in the way that losing office definitely is.
The representative is therefore an independent agent, subject to incentives and disincentives, even under the condition of the best intentions and personal incorruptibility. The purest-intentioned elected representative must thus weigh the good that can be done now in terms of their official powers against the risk of losing office — thereby losing the ability to do future good at a critical juncture, and worse, potentially losing the position to someone who will use the power to actively do evil/harm, from the perspective of the current representative or candidate. This means that this hypothetical “best-intentioned representative” is constantly faced with the possibility that foregoing good or accepting an evil may extend their term of office to do greater good and that doing good or rejecting evil may end their term of office and usher in a greater evil.
In our large-population, modern states with elaborate political hierarchies (municipal, county, state/provincial, national/federal, with multiple branches, etc.), it takes considerable resources to operate a candidacy, because one is usually competing against other candidates for the attention of a large number of voters. Such systems vary across countries, but this fact is the same in all cases under conditions of formal electoral freedom. Even under ideal conditions of equitable campaign financing and media access, election campaigns will still differ in resources relative to the effectiveness of their message and numerous, difficult-to-control conditions relating to the number of activists and volunteers that can be mustered to raise awareness, bring voters to the polls, and so on. Furthermore, because the system is hierarchical, again, with other conditions being hypothetically equal, very few (personally ideal) candidates can be successful trying to start at the “top” of the system (e.g., president, prime minister), but instead must fight the electoral battle upstream, if they have the ambition of doing good at a larger scale.
All of this necessarily becomes part of the incentive calculation for our hypothetically best-intentioned candidate. Simply put, such a candidate must factor in the ability to maintain a stable support base to pursue a political career not only to implement one good policy or piece of legislation, but over time, and upwards in the hierarchy. (Indeed, not at least appearing to strive for status-improvement in the hierarchy in the future may weaken a representative’s ability to enact policy in the present, by causing their colleagues to filter out their future influence on said colleagues’ own political careers.)
What does this mean for the role of ideology and material benefit in the political system? Quite simply, both are effectively marginal/tangential to the system as a whole. The main currency of representative democracy is politics itself, whereby good or at least ideologically-consistent policy is a by-product created by interactions among representatives who must necessarily balance all decisions against the benefit of continuing their political careers. This, I must emphasize once again, is under the hypothetical conditions of maximum honesty and good intentions among such representatives, conditions that of course we do not obtain in the real world.
Anyone, inside or outside the formal houses of representative democracy, who is principally interested in an ideological or material aim that they believe must be achieved through legislature or state orders, is therefore also constrained to consider the incentive structure of representative democracy in terms of the political career of the representatives. This means, even given ideal circumstances of personal probity and ideological alignment which do not hold in the real world, that they must provide a stable basis upon which a significant number of representatives can resolve the choice between doing good now and doing good later at the minimal total “goodness cost” overall. Ideological movements that are not able to supply an close-to-optimal resolution between these choices will, one way or another, not be able to obtain the cooperation of sufficient representatives as to implement policy.
Then, factor in the reality that we do not live in an ideal world of equal financial resources, media time, personal probity, ideological commitment, and so on…